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Abstract. Local administrations play a key role in delivering adaptation to climate
change. To do so, they need to address collective action. Based on transaction
costs economics, this paper explores the role of so-called integrative and
segregative institutions in the way local administrations adapt – whether their
different functional branches respond to climate change collectively rather than
independently. Through a comparative analysis of 19 climate-sensitive local
administrations in Germany, the paper shows that variation in the way local
administrations structure their internal coordination determines the way they
approach climate adaptation. Under integrative institutions, local administrations
adjust prior coordination structures to accommodate adaptation. Under
segregative institutions, administrations move towards integrative institutions in
order to adapt, provided they already ‘feel’ climate change.
1. Introduction1
Increasingly frequent extreme weather events and the waning prospects of
a credible international commitment to curb greenhouse gases have given
momentum to climate adaptation. Adapting to climate change consists in
changing the ways individuals and society deal with those resources and assets
threatened by climate impacts. However, it is not to be taken for granted that
humanity will adapt to a future of changed climatic conditions: barriers impeding
adaptation action in the face of expected climatic changes are many.
Part of what makes adaptation difficult is its character as collective action.
Analyses of those incentives for or against collective action for adaptation haven’t
yet come about, though. As a result, we know surprisingly little about how the
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institutional structures shaping the provision of and access to climate-threatened
resources are expected to perform under a different climate. More specifically,
it’s an open question whether and under what circumstances institutional change
is to come about as a product of climate change, leading to adapted governance
forms.
The present paper addresses that very question from the point of view
of transaction costs economics, focusing on the way institutions handle
interdependencies between functional units within a specific type of organization:
local administrations. After framing the question in transaction costs economics
terms, the paper presents a mid-N comparative analysis of 19 cases of adaptation
by local administrations in Germany. Results show that institutional change
aimed at delivering climate adaptation varies under different governance forms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 provides a framework for analysis. Section 4 details the materials used
for empirical purposes and the methods employed to process them. Section 5
presents the results, which are discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 offers
some concluding remarks.
2. Insights from the literature
Institutions, coordination and governance forms in climate adaptation
Scholars of institutional economics are not necessarily familiar with climate
adaptation. A short peek at the theoretical debates among adaptation scholars
is therefore in order. Two elements of them are worth noting. First, adaptation
scholars link adaptation barriers to collective action problems (Adger, 2003;
Hinkel et al., 2010; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Local administrations are key actors in
the implementation of climate adaptation measures (Dodman and Satterthwaite,
2008; Few et al., 2011). Scholars question their capabilities in these respect,
however (Amundsen et al., 2010; Keskitalo and Kulyasova, 2009; Næss et al.,
2005).
The above helps in specifying the object of the present analysis. Leaving
aside instances of individual climate adaptation such as double glazing in urban
dwellings or livelihood diversification in subsistence agriculture communities,
the present work addresses municipalities planning and executing adaptation
measures in democratic market economies. A link to institutional theory
is established by opening up the ‘black box’ of local administrations and
exploring how actual governance forms shape collective action among their
functional units. For that, transaction costs economics is employed (Coase, 1960;
Williamson, 1998).
Transaction costs economics is an ideal candidate for the task ahead, as
it addresses the link between variation in governance forms and variation
in the attributes of the problems the same governance forms are meant to
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tackle. Originally focusing on the costs of using the market as an allocation
system (Coase, 1960), transaction costs economics has proven insightful in
many applications in natural resource management (Birner and Wittmer, 2004;
Marshall, 2013; Roggero, 2015; Roggero and Fritsch, 2010; Thiel et al., 2012).
A starting point for the present analysis is Williamson’s discriminating
alignment hypothesis (Williamson, 1985), postulating that governance forms
‘align’ with the properties of the transactions they are to regulate. Transactions
are the ‘transfer(s) of goods and services across a technologically separable
interface’ (Williamson, 1985: 1). They are characterized by asset specificity,
uncertainty and frequency. Based on these attributes, Williamson (1985) draws
the line between market solutions and vertical integration: different institutional
arrangements (markets, hierarchies or hybrid) perform differently in terms of the
minimization of transaction costs based on the particular configuration of the
three dimensions above.
Different characteristics will then be pertinent to different settings: many
attempts have been made to provide suitable characterizations for different types
of transactions (Birner and Wittmer, 2004; Hagedorn et al., 2002; McCann,
2013; Williamson, 1998), sometimes alternative to the ones above, sometimes
complementing them (see Thiel et al., 2016 for an overview). Most relevant
in our case is Hagedorn’s focus on modularity and functional interdependence
(Hagedorn, 2008; 2015) as discriminants between ‘integrative’ and ‘segregative’
institutions. While functional interdependence is a given among interdependent
actors, the concept of modularity needs further articulation. This is done below.
Modularity
The modularity of transactions captures the decomposability of processes in self-
contained sub-processes (Baldwin 2007; Langlois 2002, 2006; Simon, 1962).
Modularity has implications for the concept of transaction used by Williamson,
which implicitly assumes that the activities at both ends of a transaction are
bound together by a small, clearly defined set of interdependencies. In Baldwin’s
terminology, that is a ‘thin crossing point’ (Baldwin, 2007: 165). If activities are
separated by a thin crossing point, the least-cost arrangement is to assign them
to different units or ‘modules’.
However, interdependencies between two activities may as well be many
and complex, identifying a ‘thick’ crossing point. If that is the case, the least-
cost arrangement is to have a single unit performing both activities. As a
result, organizational boundaries will match ‘thin’ boundaries between activities,
whereas ‘thick’ ones will fall within individual units. Transactions only take place
across thin boundaries, whereas thick boundaries are dealt with through the
internal organization of individual units. Figure 1 below provides an illustration.
The reader can easily visualize Figure 1 by referring to the case of a
construction permit. Such a permit typically requires, on one hand, a set of
environmental impact assessments (effects on the water table, drainage, risk of
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Figure 1. (Colour online) Modularity and organizational boundaries
contaminated soils being released, effects on flora and fauna, threats to endemic
endangered species and the like). At the same time, it raises a series of planning
issues (compliance with zoning regulations, building codes, labour and safety
regulations, etc.). Environmental assessments are highly interdependent: they
cannot make contrary assumptions concerning climate change, for instance.
Similar considerations hold for planning issues.
Note however that environmental impact assessments and planning issues
are only weakly interdependent with one another. Baldwin (2007) would thus
see there ‘thick crossing points’ between the several sub-tasks making up both
the environmental impact assessment and the planning issues. Between the
environmental impact assessment as a whole and planning as a whole, she would
see instead a ‘thin’ crossing point. She would then expect the two tasks to be
accomplished by two separate units, divided by an organizational boundary at
the thin crossing point.
This reasoning rests on an over-simplistic understanding of how organizations
structure themselves, though. Organizational boundaries can be set for
reasons other than minimizing the need for coordination, implying that
highly interdependent activities may as well be assigned to different units.
Yet transactions between highly interdependent activities can be modularized
through rules such as technical standards (Baldwin, 2007): by shaping mutual
expectations, rules greatly decrease the effort necessary to coordinate highly
interdependent activities across different units of the same organization.
Bringing the above reasoning to its logical conclusions, organizational
boundaries can be set everywhere, as long as rules can be established that
modularize those functionally interdependent activities on both sides of the
Adapting as usual 561
Figure 2. (Colour online) Integration and modularization
resulting transaction. As a result, organizational boundaries do not reflect much
the degree of ‘thickness’ of the layer of interdependencies but rather whether
such thick layers can be ‘thinned’ through rules that modularize the transaction
between the actors on both sides of it. Figure 2 provides an illustration.
Segregative and integrative institutions
Against this background, the distinction between integrative and segregative
institutions (Hagedorn 2008; 2015) can be put to use: rules can either segregate
actors, allowing them to simplify things and neglect interdependencies (as in the
case of rules modularizing the transactions introduced above), or integrate them,
requiring them to coordinate action, embedding decisions in intense and direct
social relations. To see the difference, compare institutions such as check-lists
and meetings: the former allow actors within an organization to go ahead (or
not) on a particular task on the basis of a narrow set of conditions. The latter
require the same actors to meet and discuss various aspects of a task before
acting on it.
This implies a qualitative shift fromWilliamson’s initial concern – whether the
same interdependent activities are best governed by a single integrated entity as
opposed to plural ones. Here, a plurality of actors is assumed – the question being
whether such actors act jointly (through integrative institutions) or independently
(through segregative institutions). This, in turn, depends on the trade-off between
the costs of integration and the costs of segregation (Figure 3).
Building up on the legacy of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), the basic logic of
Figure 3 is that a decision-making process can internalize a varying amount
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Figure 3. Integration and segregation costs
of interdependencies. The more interdependencies are internalized, the less
costs are shifted upon third parties, lowering the amount of monitoring and
sanctioning needed. Yet an increasing amount of interdependencies being taken
into account, making decisions slower and more cumbersome. There is thus a
trade-off between the costs of increased integration (‘integration costs’, or the
costs of ‘embedding decisions in social relations’) and the costs of increased
segregation (‘segregation costs’, or the consequences of deviating from a social
optimum due to neglected interdependencies: see Hagedorn, 2015).
Both cost curves are conceptualized as convex, and thus non-linear. This
characteristic is a legacy of both Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Hagedorn
(2015), and it seems reasonable to follow it: taking a third point of view
into account while making a decision is certainly less exhausting (and hence
marginally less costly) than taking the eleventh one into account, after balancing
the first ten. Symmetrically, the more interdependencies are neglected, the more
the biophysical system can be expected to approach its tipping point(s), showing
resilience at first (the flat part of the segregation costs curve) and quickly
transitioning to high costs (the steep part of the same curve).
Characterizing governance forms as a trade-off between different cost curves
certainly offers an intriguing starting point for quantification exercises. Yet the
quantification of transaction costs has so far proven challenging (McCann et al.,
2005). It seems therefore safe to focus on the qualitative question here: whether
the trade-off between integration and segregation costs will lean towards high
segregation (that is: low integration) rather than towards low segregation (high
integration), deeming the governance form segregative rather than integrative.
That in turn depends on the relative shape of the integration and segregation
costs curves, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 portrays two situations with identical integration cost curves and
different segregation cost ones. There’s a qualitative difference between the two:
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Figure 4. Costs of integrative and segregative institutions
the diagram to the left describes a situation in which many interdependencies
can be neglected before segregation costs escalate. The least-cost arrangement is
one of low integration, governed by segregative institutions. In the right-hand
diagram, segregation costs are higher, leading to integrative institutions.
3. Towards an analytical framework
Setting the stage: the action situation
Except for the very beginning of section 2, the concepts above have been
articulated in general terms, without reference to the specific action situations
at stake within local administrations. This becomes necessary now, since
further specification will allow us to narrow down: (1) the nature of the
interdependencies at stake; (2) the integrative versus segregative nature of the
status quo institutions; and (3) whether and how climate change may trigger
a shift towards segregative rather than integrative institutions. The last point
represents this paper’s research question.
Local admnistrations are conceptualized as comprising functionally diversified
units, each one responsible for the direct provision of particular environmental
resources from which citizens derive a benefit (recreation areas, air quality, trees,
grass, etc.). Interdependencies among such units emerge from the biophysical
links between such resources. Choices concerning the environment, for example,
have direct effects on allergies: as a result, allergy plans may be completely
off-set by choices concerning parks and alleys. Health units (designing allergy
plans) therefore need to work closely with environmental units (designing parks
and alleys). Failing to do so may lead to significant administrative and political
transaction costs, exposing individual units and the administration as a whole
to various kinds of pressures, from open critique to litigation in court.
Administrations vary in terms of their internal coordination. Two elements are
particularly crucial: (1) the availability of coordination structures, either formal
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or informal; (2) the role of ad-hoc, informal versusmore structured coordination.
We interpret diversity in these regards as the result of varying integration costs.
At the lower, less ‘integrated’ end of the spectrum, administrations address
interdependencies in an ad hoc way, while at the higher, more ‘integrated’
end, they coordinate in a structured fashion, be it through informal but regular
exchanges or by entrusting particular units to facilitate coordination.
Finally, climate change acts as a driver of change by affecting the resources
at stake, changing those baseline conditions on which local administrations
base their work: climate change introduces uncertainty concerning the way the
ecosystem at stake will perform, potentially pushing some of its features outside
the boundaries for which knowledge exists. Changing vegetation periods, for
example, shift the temporal and spatial distribution of pollen release, potentially
offsetting schemes that minimize discomfort to the allergic, as medications may
be made available too late or too early – the more so if the environment
department adapts to climate change by choosing new plants and tree species
without consulting the health department first.
Implications for the cost curves
Integration cost curves link integration costs to actual integration efforts, raising
the question whether public administrations and their individual units face
different cost curves. To the contrary, it is safe to assume that they all face the
same cost curve and find themselves at different points along it. This may seem
a strong assumption. Yet administrations have a rather narrow set of options
for involving stakeholders in decision making, making it unlikely that decision-
making processes of similar complexity lead to significantly different decision-
making efforts across administrations. By the same token, larger decision-making
efforts imply a larger number of interdependencies being taken into account.
Whereas integration cost curves are the same for all administrations,
segregation cost curves are not. They depend on perceived local biophysical
circumstances, causing the physical attributes of the ‘transaction’ at stake to
vary across administrations. Specifically, administrations may differ in terms of
how they subjectively perceive the nexus between the interdependencies they
can neglect and the transaction costs they can expect to face if they implement
inadequate or unpopular solutions.
If segregation cost curves differ across units, but integration cost curves
do not, a link can be established between the investments in coordination
observed and the subjective perception of the biophysical conditions justifying
such investments. Observing integrative institutions denotes high investments
in coordination, which in turn reveal perceptions of a complex system
of highly interdependent environmental resources. Observing segregative
institutions, instead, implies resources being conceived of as simple and loosely
interconnected, making it worthwhile to keep integration costs low. With
reference to Figure 4, observing high rather than low i∗ (and the corresponding
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x∗) indicates whether the segregation curve at stake is similar to the one in
the left-hand diagram rather than the one to the right, respectively indicating
segregative versus integrative institutions.
The effects of a changing climate upon cost curves
The discussion above distinguishes integrative and segregative institutions by
relying on integration and segregation cost curves. Let us now address the effects
of a changing climate upon such curves, and the institutional change potentially
ensuing. This has pointed to an increase in uncertainty, raising the question how
it is expected to affect integration and segregation curves.
Integration cost curves express the effort necessary in order to address a certain
number of interdependencies in a given decision. Additional uncertainty doesn’t
change how complex it is to address any number of interdependencies per se.
Rather than that, it may require more interdependencies to be taken into account.
This implies movements along the curve rather than a shifting of the curve itself.
To the contrary, increased uncertainty is likely to affect segregation cost curves.
Increased uncertainty makes the same amount of interdependencies costlier to
deal with in light of the potentially larger number of unintended effects to be
taken into account. This equals to an ‘upward shift’ of the segregation costs
curve, causing a shift of the least-cost arrangement towards more integration.2
This reasoning effectively provides a transaction costs explanation for the
popularity of collective action in the literature on local adaptation. The relevant
question, though, is whether the upward shift will be different under segregative
and integrative institutions. Recalling that the distinction between integrative
and segregative governance forms reflects different segregation cost curves (see
Figure 4), this question becomes one of disentangling the interplay between the
shape of the segregation cost curve and the upward shift caused by increased
uncertainty.
Under integrative institutions, any further upward shift of the segregation
cost curve can do nothing other than call for further integration. Additional
uncertainty, in other words, won’t trigger a change from integrative to
segregative institutions. Furthermore, the segregation cost curve meets the
integration cost curve at a very high slope – close to the infinitely costly situation
of full integration. Because of that, enormous upward shifts are necessary for
substantial increases in integration.More likely, the upward shift will only trigger
a moderate increase in integration.
More interesting is the case of segregation cost curves leading to
segregative governance arrangements. These represent situations characterized
by comparatively few well-understood interdependencies, which can be either
left out of decisions or addressed through rules without causing substantial
2 The interested reader can find a diagrammatic illustration of this in the supplementary material –
see Figure X1.
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implementation costs. In the face of increased uncertainty, this situation may
give rise to two alternative scenarios: (1) that interdependencies are so well
understood that uncertainty hardly affects implementation costs; (2) that
uncertainty particularly affects those interdependencies previously considered
well understood.
In the first scenario, the segregation cost curve retains its main characteristic:
that implementation costs become substantial only very late. Without a
qualitative change in the segregation cost curve, no qualitative change from
segregative to integrative institutions is expected. In the second scenario,
however, the segregation cost curve implies implementation costs that increase
rather early, becoming similar to the case of integrative institutions. Increased
uncertainty therefore results in a shift towards integrative institutions.3
4. Materials and methods
Data collection: case selection and coding
The empirical material for this paper was collected within the econCCadapt
project between 2012 and 2015. During econCCadapt, the authors of this paper
carried out an institutional analysis of local climate adaptation, focusing on
municipalities along the Lower Rhine and the North Sea coast. Deliverables are
available on the project’s website that describe in detail the data we employ here.
For the reader’s convenience, a brief summary is provided below.
The project focused on heat, heavy rains and floods in ‘climate-sensitive’
local administrations. These were identified through indicators by the German
Ministry of Transport, Construction and Urban Development (Gruehn et al.,
2010). In short, local administrations on the Lower Rhine or on the North
Sea coast, including the ‘city-states’ of Hamburg and Bremen, were identified
as ‘highly sensitive’ to climate change if they featured in the highest quartile for
built surfaces and at least one more sensitivity indicator (elderly citizens for heat;
infrastructure for heavy rains and flood risk areas for floods).
This led to 25 local administrations, six of which dropped out of the study
for different reasons (representatives not available, unreachable, or ‘special’ and
thus not comparable administrative constructs, etc.). In the remaining 19, semi-
structured interviews were carried out with representatives of the environment,
planning, environment and water departments. For each local administration,
interview materials were consolidated into a case study narrative, which was
then sent back to the interview partners for comments, additions and revisions.
The revised case study narratives were subsequently coded along a number
of variables capturing, on one hand, the way ‘horizontal’ coordination across
units and departments comes about and, on the other hand, the way climate
impacts are perceived and translated into adaptation processes. This has
3 Both scenarios are illustrated in Figure X2 in the supplementary material.
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led to a table containing 19 records of 22 different descriptors.4 So much
information allows for a much broader range of analyses than of interest
here. Let us therefore focus on those descriptors we will rely upon for testing
the hypotheses above: ‘Coord_Units’, ‘Early_Coord’, ‘Vulnerability_ACTUAL’,
‘Need2Adapt_Projected’, ‘Fine_Tuning’, ‘Ongoing_Process’.
The interested reader can refer to the supplementary material,5 where
Table X1 reports in tabular form how each municipality scores against
the above-mentioned descriptors – cell values expressing whether the given
descriptor is observed or not. The case studies were originally coded using
fuzzy-set membership scores. For our purposes, scores were converted into
binary expressions, allowing for more intuitive graphical representations (Venn
diagrams or, in this case, two-by-two matrices rather than scatterplots).
Let us now turn to the meaning of the individual descriptors. The first
two reflect the municipalities’ diversity in terms of organizational forms.
‘Coord_Units’, in particular, expresses which municipalities have units with
coordination purposes. These are usually individual positions and/or task forces
addressing a specific issue (typically: social integration, sustainability, housing),
and doing so by coordinating the action of other units rather than acting
themselves.
‘Early_Coord’ captures instead informal coordination practices and expresses
whether these are dominant over formal procedures: in those local
administrations, officials first coordinate informally and then formalize their
decisions through the regular procedures. Please note that both descriptors refer
to administrative action in general and not in relation to climate adaptation. The
analysis would otherwise become tautological.
The remaining descriptors provide a picture of how the municipalities perceive
the adaptation ahead: whether municipalities already ‘feel’ climate change
(‘Vulnerability_ACTUAL’); whether they perceive the need to adapt in the future
because of this (‘Need2Adapt_Projected’); whether their current coordination
structures are capable of addressing climate change by some minor adjustments
(‘Fine_Tuning’); andwhether actual adaptation processes are currently underway
(‘Ongoing_Process’).
Data processing: set relations
In order to test whether the available evidence supports our theoretical
expectations, the present papers employs set-theoretic methods as laid down
by Ragin (2006) and Schneider and Wagemann (2012). It relies on the statistical
package by Quaranta and Schneider (2013). Set-theoretical methods focus on
exploring set relations. The aforementioned descriptors represent therefore ‘sets’,
4 See supplementary material, Figure X3.
5 See note 1.
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such as the ‘set of all municipal administrations featuring coordination units’
(‘Coord_Units’).
For each descriptor, values of one and zero respectively indicate the
membership and non-membership of the given municipality in the corresponding
set. Once the membership of the cases under study in the sets of interest is
clear, the analyst can turn to exploring ‘set relations’, or relations between
sets: whether, for example, the set of municipalities featuring coordination units
(‘Coord_Units’) is a subset, a superset or is identical to the set of municipalities
featuring ongoing adaptation processes (‘Ongoing_Process’). This is done by
assessing the distribution of the available cases across the intersections of the
two sets at stake: how many cases are observed belong to both sets, to none, or
to either one of them but not the other.
Once set relations are established, using them as a tool for (social) scientific
inquiry is done by interpreting them as sufficiency and/or necessity claims: if
‘Coord_Units’ is a subset of ‘Ongoing_Process’, then having coordination units is
a sufficient condition for having adaptation processes underway. Symmetrically,
if ‘Early_Coord’ is a superset of ‘Fine_Tuning’, then informal coordination
efforts prior to formal, official ones are a necessary condition for coordination
structures to handle adaptation via minor, incremental adjustments.
In practice, the above translates into simple two-by-two matrices, coupled
with a small set of ‘measures of fit’ expressing the relative frequency of cases
compliant with versus contradicting a particular claim.Matters of space preclude
an exposition of such measures, their meaning, interpretation and pitfalls. In the
following, we will therefore report them for matters of completeness but will not
rely on them for explanatory and illustrative purposes: readers will only need to
keep in mind that we will not strive for full consistency but rather accept, within
reason, a minimal amount of contradictory evidence. The interested reader can
refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012) for a detailed treatment.
5. Analysis and results
The present section explores empirically the question whether administrations
characterized by segregative rather than integrative institutions react differently
to the increased coordination required to address the uncertainty brought
about by climate change. It does so in a stepwise fashion, first distinguishing
local administrations based on their reliance on integrative versus segregative
institutions (Analysis 0), subsequently addressing integrative institutions
(Analysis 1), and finally focusing on the specifics of segregative institutions
(Analysis 2). All analyses are based on the set relations illustrated in Figure 5.
Analysis 0: Integrative versus segregative institutions in local administrations
Local administrations can embed decisions in social relations both in formal
terms and through informal practices – in ways that are not mutually exclusive.
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Figure 5. Set relations
The available dataset provides two descriptors respectively capturing the
former and the latter: ‘Coord_Units’ and ‘Early_Coord’. Local administrations
presenting both are certainly investing substantial manpower in coordination
activities (high ‘i∗’ in Figure 4, right-hand diagram) and will thus be considered
as characterized by integrative institutions.
All other local administrations will instead count as segregative: either they do
not invest manpower in coordination (‘Coord_Units’ not observed), or they rely
on procedures rather than on social interaction (‘Early_Coord’ not observed),
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or both. Figure 5a shows the resulting distribution of local administrations
between the two sets, showing a rather balanced split. More importantly,
though, some anecdotal evidence from the case studies will help illustrate the
qualitative difference between the two sets (‘Coord_Units’ and ‘Early_Coord’).
Let us first address LocAdm_10 and LocAdm_11, where early coordination and
coordination units respectively are observed, but not together.
LocAdm_10 has some cross-cutting units, but they are not representative
of the way things are done there. Early coordination does take place, but
only if the complexity of the issues at stake justifies it. The organization of
LocAdm_11 foresees instead positions in coordination roles; it prefers however
formal over informal coordination processes, so that different standpoints are
brought forward independently of one another and are integrated at a later
stage. The qualitative picture emerging from the case studies is thus one where
municipalities do feature some degree of integration, but impose limits on it.
In comparison, the question for LocAdm_09 (featuring both early
coordination and coordination units) is rather one of choosing the right
integrative institution among many. The rationale emerging from the interviews
is that some issues are best dealt with through formal integrative institutions,
other ones through informal processes. Segregative institutions, requiring some
units to stake their claims without consideration for other units, only come about
when strictly required by law. This is a qualitatively different approach than
the one taken in the earlier two cases. Most importantly, it’s the simultaneous
presence of formal (‘Coord_Units’) and informal (‘Early_Coord’) institutions
that draws the line here.
Analysis 1: Integrative institutions
Local administrations characterized by integrative institutions are expected
to provide the coordination needed to adapt to climate change by adjusting
available coordination structures. An operational distinction between integrative
and segregative institutions has been provided. Both vulnerability to climate
change and the adjustment of prior structures will be operationalized herewith
through the descriptors ‘Need2Adapt_Projected’ and ‘Fine_Tuning’.
These theoretical expectations will be confirmed if the set of those local
administrations featuring integrative institutions and perceiving the need to
adapt to climate change is a subset of those local administrations adjusting prior
institutions. The two sets are confronted in Figure 5b. One can see that, if the
need for adaptation is perceived, integrative institutions are a sufficient condition
for adaptation processes – provided such processes are understood as the
adjustment of existing coordination structures (‘Fine_Tuning’). The sufficiency
claim is technically solid (consistency score: 0.778) and explains a large portion
of the compliant cases (coverage score: 0.636). Yet it is worthwhile to search the
cases for an illustration of the mechanism highlighted by Figure 5b.
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Projecting the need to adapt to climate impacts (‘Need2Adapt_Projected’)
and featuring both formal and informal coordination structures (‘Integra-
tive_Institutions’), LocAdm_09 is again a good term of reference. Interviews
highlight the cross-cutting nature of climate adaptation and hence the need to
proceed in a coordinated fashion. Interestingly, interviewees report how this
became clear during past pilot projects, which have shown a broad range of
affected units within the administration. They do question, though, whether
these and similar processes are actually new, or whether they are better seen in
the frame of the natural flexibility of administrative operations (‘Fine_Tuning’).
Analysis 2: Segregative institutions
This conceptualization grants a key role to uncertainty as a mechanism leading
to more integration (via adaptation processes) by raising segregation costs.
Segregative institutions have an ambiguous relationship with uncertainty, calling
for a closer look. Figure 5c confronts segregative institutions with the need to
adapt. As expected, no clear set relation exists between the two sets.
The absence of a clear link between segregative institutions and perceived
climate vulnerability makes it worthwhile to restrict the analysis to those
eight local administrations featuring segregative institutions. The role of
uncertainty is captured by ‘Vulnerability_ACTUAL’, a set encompassing those
local administrations that already ‘feel’ climate impact, ruling out uncertainty.
This is confronted with ‘Need2Adapt_Projected’ in Figure 5d.
The figure shows that the two sets overlap to about 80% (consistency and
coverage scores for both sufficiency and necessity: 0.8). Leaving technicalities
aside, both sufficiency and necessity claims are contradicted by just one case,
which can be tolerated. For the purposes of this analysis, the empirical evidence
is compatible with a claim that local administrations characterized by segregative
institutions perceive the need to adapt if and only if they already ‘feel’ climate
impacts.
The link between vulnerability and the need to adapt is not surprising and
reflects the well-known reactive character of adaptation found elsewhere in the
literature. More interesting here is to characterize such a link in the context
of segregative institutions. This is best done with reference to LocAdm_12.
Interviews report that, when impacts are felt, problem owners understandably
react and plan accordingly. More importantly, though, they also stress the need
to coordinate adaptation action in order to avoid parallel work – a need for
increased integration.
Addressing increased integration, Figure 5e tackles the question whether,
once uncertainty is ruled out (‘Vulnerability_ACTUAL’) and the need to
adapt is perceived (‘Need2Adapt_Projected’), segregative institutions actually
lead to adaptation processes (‘Ongoing_Process’). This is confirmed: with the
exception of just one case (LocAdm_17), featuring ‘Vulnerability_ACTUAL’
and ‘Need2Adapt_Projected’ constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for
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‘Ongoing_Process’ (consistency for necessity: 1; coverage: 0.75; consistency for
sufficiency: 0.75; coverage: 1). This is best illustrated with reference to the case
of LocAdm_11.
LocAdm_11 currently experiences drought problems in its green spaces, even
in spite of very recent heavy rain events (‘Vulnerability_ACTUAL’). Adaptation
is at the stage of planning and preparation rather than actual measures
(‘Need2Adapt_Projected’). In that context, some interviewees feel confident
about the possibility of coordinating action through the available institutions.
Other stress, instead, that adaptation is simply too integrative a task for the
usual tools and procedures. As a matter of fact, several units are experimenting
with new forms of coordination (‘Ongoing_Process’), suggesting, as expected, a
move towards integrative institutions.
6. Discussion
Summary of the findings
The analyses above have provided the following results. First, local
administrations do differ in terms of segregative versus integrative institutions
(Analysis 0). Second, this difference has a bearing on the way they
approach adaptation. Under integrative institutions, local administrations tackle
adaptation by adjusting available coordination structures so as to address
climate change (Analysis 1). Under segregative institutions, local administrations
implement adaptation processes and thus increase the amount of integration
between their functional units. However, uncertainty induced by climate change
is per se not sufficient to shift their segregation costs curve: for that to happen,
the actual experience of climate impacts is necessary (Analysis 2). That said,
caution is due while generalizing from these results: the limitations and potential
pitfalls are discussed below.
Limits of materials and methods
A first limitation of the present work relates to the geographical scope of the
empirical materials. The German study area is large enough to provide variation
in socio-economic and cultural terms, as it includes both large and small local
administrations, both rich and poor communities, both densely and sparsely
populated areas. Yet it does not exhaust the variability available within a large
federal country such as Germany, let alone Europe or the global north. Concerns
about the context-specificity of these results should not be overemphasized,
though: contrary to much adaptation and institutional research based on single
case studies, the present work delivers a comparative analysis that is actually
below average in terms of context-specificity.
A more serious case selection issue concerns the missing cases. The ‘universe’
at stake is the set of all climate-sensitive local administrations in the two chosen
study areas, encompassing 25 cases. Yet only 19 could be approached. There is
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no reason to assume that particular biases are being introduced by these missing
six cases. Yet it cannot be excluded that some of the analyses would come to
different conclusions if a few cases were added to the dataset. This is particularly
relevant for Analysis 2, which addresses only a subset of the available cases and
would be therefore affected the most if additional non-compliant cases were
added.
Further considerations are due with reference to the data collection and coding
process. A single author performed the coding of the individual case studies,
raising reliability questions. However, the case studies were based on structured
interviews designed and carried out by the same author who later drafted the
case studies and coded them, ensuring a much deeper knowledge of the cases
than what multiple authors could have gathered from the case study texts alone.
Caution is also due with reference to the use of crisp rather than fuzzy sets.
The available evidence was originally expressed using fuzzy sets, capturing the
degree of ambiguity (‘fuzziness’) surrounding the membership of each case in
each set. Such ambiguity was not considered here. The conversion from fuzzy
to crisp sets is not problematic. More important is that repeating the analyses
above with fuzzy sets doesn’t lead to the same results. This is expected: taking
ambiguity into account requires more nuanced analyses than performed here.
Limits of the conceptualization
Having highlighted the limits of materials and methods, the discussion
can now focus on the paper’s conceptualization. Three elements of it
appear worth discussing: the link between climate uncertainty and ecological
interdependencies; the effect of uncertainty upon segregation costs; and the way
administrations react to such segregation costs as conceptualized herewith.
First, understanding climate change in terms of increased uncertainty
over biophysical interdependencies will admittedly sound outlandish at
first. Specifically, climate uncertainty pertains different future states of the
environment, not its connectivity. Yet interdependencies are known at best within
boundaries, and whether climate change will stay within those boundaries is
indeed uncertain, effectively leading to uncertain biophysical interdependencies
that may, no doubt, require substantial readjustments of resource management
practices.
Second, it is worth discussing whether increasingly uncertain interdependen-
cies actually lead to increased segregation costs. Key is the increased likelihood
of ‘hurting’ resource users, together with the increased need to ensure the
functionality of any particular resource by restricting the use of other ones.
The reader shall be reminded here that segregation costs are understood strictly
with reference to the action situation of the administrative unit: therefore they
do not encompass the ‘external costs’ experienced by the resource users. Instead,
they express the effort administrative units have to put into responding to users
who bear such (hypothetical) external costs.
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This implies a mechanism in which resource users perceive losses, are able
to attribute them to the actions of the local administration, and are able to
act against the responsible unit (possibly also indirectly, via political hierarchies
and/or the actions of other administrative units involved). This represents a
rather long causality chain, which would be worthwhile studying on its own
account. While generally plausible, such a long causality chain may indeed
present non-linear and counterintuitive characteristics, potentially invalidating
the mechanism postulated herewith.
In spite of all the above, it is important to stress that the mechanism at stake
needs only to have cognitive, not ontological validity. The conceptualization
focuses on the action situation administrative units find themselves in. It is
therefore sufficient that officials realistically expect and/or anticipate reactions
from the resource users. That is certainly not far-fetched. Also, if the mechanism
at stake has a cognitive rather than ontological nature, counterintuitive properties
are effectively ruled out: it would be rather unrealistic for administration officials
to structure their expectations towards the general public by the means of
elaborated algorithms.
Implications for the literature
Let us now review the implications of our findings for the literature. Starting
with institutional economics, an important lesson relates to the reactive way
in which institutional change takes place. In the absence of prior integrative
institutions, interdependencies (and the cost of neglecting them) must be certain
for new institutions to come about, transitioning from segregative to integrative
institutions. This resonates well with those contributions stressing the link
between shared mental models and institutions (Denzau and North, 1994) and
the challenges it poses to institutional change (Bromley, 2006).
Given that uncertainty is a pervasive phenomenon when dealing with
environmental resources (Vatn, 2005), this implies that many institutions
are likely to be less integrative than they actually should be. For those
institutional arrangements, segregation costs could be traded off against the
costs of increased integration with a win. Indeed, contributions calling for
inclusiveness, participation and coordination are rather frequent in the literature
on environmental issues (including climate adaptation). The above could provide
an institutional economic explanation for such calls.
Concerning the literature on climate adaptation, this paper’s findings call first
of all for a more nuanced take on the role and potential of local administrations
to prepare for climate change. Scholars have not yet achieved consensus
over the adaptive capacity of local administrations, particularly concerning
coordination and resources (Amundsen et al., 2010; Keskitalo and Kulyasova,
2009). This paper shows that, concerning coordination, local administrations
vary. Anchoring the discussion in terms of the appropriate level at which to
tackle climate adaptation may therefore be misleading.
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Furthermore, administrations vary qualitatively in the way they address
climate adaptation. Integrative institutions lead to the incremental adjustment
of available coordination structures. Segregative institutions, on the other hand,
hamper the development of integrative institutions as long as uncertainty is
present. This implies that calls for increased coordination won’t do. Under
integrative institutions, further calls for integration equal to preaching the
converted. Under segregative institutions, the focus is misplaced: administrations
will increase integration, but only once they see the need to.
Amundsen et al. (2010) find that the implementation of adaptation requires a
history of extreme weather events, which local governments allegedly know best.
Yet this paper suggests a different story: a history (or even a present) of extreme
weather events is necessary so as to overcome uncertainty, which otherwise
prevents local administrations from organizing for adaptation and coordinated
action. The empirical data confirm this. In these respects, experience with climate
impacts has seemingly little to do with knowing where and how exactly they will
hit. It has more to do with acknowledging that they will hit. The argument that
local administrations know best can therefore be questioned.
Uncertainty seems to prevent local administrations characterized by
segregative institutions to move towards integrative ones. Taking this
circumstance at face value would imply that renewed efforts should be put
into removing uncertainty from climate projections. This however, may never
happen: uncertainty may be a constitutive part of the systems that climate
sciences describe, not therefore being amenable to removal through ever more
precise modelling efforts. In these regards, there is scope for joint efforts between
institutional and the climate adaptation scholars to understand the institutional
nature of uncertainty as a barrier to adaptation and explore ways to increase
integration in spite of it.
7. Conclusions
Increasingly compelling climate reports, extreme weather events and the general
failure of international politics to credibly curb greenhouse gases have provided
an incredible momentum to climate adaptation. Many national governments
have put climate adaptation on their agenda, yet the burden of preparing for a
future of increased climate uncertainty rests mostly on the work and judgement
of local administrations. Academia is divided on the very capacity of local
administrations to live up to such a challenge.
Based on transaction costs economics, this paper has provided an institutional
analysis of a specific question concerning how local administrations adapt:
whether or not their different functional branches are expected to respond to
climate change in a coordinated fashion. Questions of collective action have been
present in the adaptation literature for many years now. Institutional economics
analyses of those incentives for or against collective action for local adaptation
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haven’t yet come about, however. There’s thus a research gap to be filled, starting
with the present contribution.
Focusing on the distinction between integrative and segregative institutions,
this paper has provided a comparative analysis of 19 climate-sensitive
local administrations in Germany. Using set-theoretical methods, the analysis
shows that variation in the way local administrations structure their internal
coordination determines the way they approach climate adaptation. Those
administrations featuring integrative institutions will adjust prior coordination
structures to accommodate the new issue. Those featuring segregative institutions
will instead equip themselves with integrative institutions for climate adaptation,
provided however that they already ‘feel’ climate change. They won’t do this if
climate impacts are uncertain.
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